It turns out that some pets for seemingly nonstandard colors have the
standard body type anyway, and vice-versa. This implies that we should
stop relying on a color's standardness, but, for the time being, we've
just revised the prediction model:
Old model:
* If I see a body_id, I find the corresponding color_ids, and it's wearable
by all pet types with those color_ids.
New model:
* If I see a body_id,
* If it also belongs to a basic pet type, it's a standard body ID.
* It therefore fits all pet types of standard color (if there's
more than one body ID modeled already). (Not really,
because of weird exceptions like Orange Chia. Should that be
standard or not?)
* If it doesn't also belong to a basic pet type, it's a nonstandard
body ID.
* It therefore only belongs to one color, and therefore the item
fits all pet types of the same color.
This one was actually pretty darn clever - nobody's abused it, but
I was reading a blog post where someone described this type of
issue, I realized it was a brilliant attack, and then realized
DTI was vulnerable. Oops. Thanks for the solution, Jamie!
http://jamie-wong.com/2012/08/22/what-i-did-at-khan-academy/#XSS+Fix
Many forms on the site contain a hidden authenticity_token field,
unique to each visitory. If a user submits a request with an
invalid authenticity_token, Rails assumes that it's a CSRF attempt
and logs out the user. So, if we happen to cache those forms with
authenticity_token fields, all users who use that form will have
the same authenticity_token (valid for only the first user who
saw the form, invalid for everyone else), and all requests made
through that form will log out the user. Bad news.
So, we stopped caching those forms. Yay!
Sharing pane works, everything is great for guests. Logged in
users are on the way, since right now Share Outfit re-saves
anonymously rather than showing sharing data for the existing
outfit.
